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Abstract 
 
This paper outlines the EU regulatory framework and analyses current practice in four European 
countries in respect of public procurement and tendering of ferry services. Tender management for major 
ferry services resides with national government agencies, while tenders for smaller volume regional 
and/or inter-isles services are generally managed by local authorities and/or regional transport authorities. 
Operator selection criteria increasingly emphasises service quality aspects, and environmental impacts, as 
well as price (i.e. amount of subsidy required). There is a continued trend towards privately-owned 
operators providing and investing in essential ferry services, with an increasing role played by larger 
international integrated transport organisations. For transport authorities, ferry service procurement 
involves a continuous evolutionary process of specifying, offering, selecting, monitoring and reviewing 
services supplied. Based on the information collected and analysed, the authors have developed a ‘tender 
route map’ which explains the different stages and key issues concerning public procurement of ferry 
services. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper outlines the regulatory framework concerning the tendering of ferry 
services by public transport authorities in the European Union (EU) and thereafter 
analyses the tendering regime and tender processes employed in four European 
countries - Denmark, Greece, Sweden and Norway - based on a case study approach. 
The research formed part of a project undertaken by the authors on behalf of the 
Scottish Government during its Scottish Ferries Review (Transport Research Institute, 
2010). The aim of the work was to review the delivery and operation of subsidised ferry 
services. 
From a public sector perspective, the delivery of essential ferry services poses a 
dilemma. The public sector may seek to guarantee a minimum level of service to a 
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particular community even though such a service might not be commercially viable, and 
thus requiring of public subsidy. At the same time the public sector needs to secure an 
operator that provides a continued service at an efficient cost level, but with the lowest 
subsidy rate possible, whilst also ensuring that important aspects of service quality are 
maintained or improved.  
Based on the results from the case study analyses the authors develop a tendering 
route map which is considered to offer useful guidance to public authorities tendering 
ferry services in future. 
 
 
2. EU Regulatory Framework  
 
2.1. Regulatory overview 
 
Any solution for state subsidised delivery of ferry services in the EU must be 
compatible with national and EU laws. Of particular relevance to the design and 
implementation of any solution are the following: 
 
- Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92, also known as the ‘Cabotage Regulation’ 
(European Commission, 2006)  
- Public Service Obligations (PSO) 
- Public Service Contracts (PSC) 
- EU and national procurement law; and  
- limitations on the provision of state aid. 
 
These legal and regulatory requirements must be taken into account by transport 
authorities when developing procurement strategies and finalising decisions on how 
ferry services should be procured.  
 
2.2. Cabotage Regulation 
 
The ‘Cabotage Regulation’ (European Commission, 2006) regulates the transportation 
of passengers and goods by sea between two points within Member States of the 
European Union (“Member States”). The ‘Cabotage Regulation’ applies the principle of 
free movement of services to maritime transport and obliges Member States to allow 
community shipowners to operate freely in the European market. 
The ‘Cabotage Regulation’ recognises that maritime transport of passengers and 
goods is vital for the inhabitants of island and peninsular communities. As such, 
exceptions to the principle of free movement of services are allowed where, owing to 
special circumstances, market forces would not provide a satisfactory level of service. 
Recognising the need to protect such ferry services to islands and remote peninsular 
communities, the ‘Cabotage Regulation’ allows Member States to intervene in 
particular markets by imposing PSOs and/or providing funding to undertakings who 
take on public service obligations through entering into PSCs. 
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2.3. Public Service Obligations  
 
Member States may impose public service obligations (PSOs) in order to ensure 
provision of an adequate regular ferry service to and from a given location where 
community shipowners, in considering their own commercial interests, would not 
provide an adequate level of service or under the same conditions. It is for individual 
Member States to determine on which routes the market would otherwise fail to provide 
adequate ferry service and, thus, which require PSOs to ensure that the required ferry 
services are provided. The nature of PSOs that a Member State may impose is limited to 
the following aspects: 
 
- requirements concerning ports to be served;  
- requirements in relation to regularity, continuity, frequency and capacity to 
provide the service in question;  
- rates to be charged for the services; and  
- manning of vessels. 
 
PSOs can be imposed by Member States in a variety of ways, although mainly this 
will involve one of the following approaches being adopted for the route in question: 
 
- entering into PSCs with individual operators for a given route; or  
- applying PSOs to all operators for a given route by way of a declaration regime, a 
licensing system or authorisation system. 
 
PSOs may be implicit within PSCs, by virtue of the specified service obligations 
included in the contracts (European Commission, 2009). It has been argued that the 
PSO is a separate matter from PSCs, and that a PSO must first be established for each 
route which is considered to require intervention in some form or other in order to meet 
the needs of the community concerned (Kay, 2008). However, the Commission has 
concluded in line with the Altmark criteria that PSOs will be clearly defined within 
PSCs (European Commission, 2009). A PSC can therefore be used to impose public 
service obligations, with the obligations set out in the contact.  
In a European Court Judgement it was stated that the combined provisions of Article 1 
and Article 4 of Regulation No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide 
services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) permit the 
provision of regular maritime cabotage services to, from and between islands to be 
made subject to prior administrative authorisation only if (European Court, 2001): 
 
- a real public service need arising from the inadequacy of the regular transport 
services under conditions of free competition can be demonstrated; 
- it is also demonstrated that a prior administrative authorisation scheme is 
necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued; 
- such a scheme is based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known 
in advance to the undertakings concerned. 
 
2.4. Public Service Contracts 
 
Public service contracts (PSCs) are the instrument generally used to impose PSOs 
where the imposition of a PSO on all ship owners would not support an area’s transport 
needs. A PSC will be used where compensation is payable for providing PSOs. A PSC 
can cover broader issues than those covered by PSOs and may include a requirement to 
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satisfy fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity and quality and require 
services to be provided at specified rates.  
PSCs can be used to ensure that ferry operators provide year-round services, where 
the market would not otherwise provide such services. In limited circumstances, 
exclusivity to provide a service may be appropriate. The PSC: 
 
- is shipowner specific; 
- is concluded between the State/Region and a specific operator on a given route or 
routes. 
 
A Member State may impose PSOs that affect some shipping companies operating on 
the route(s) concerned and, at the same time, conclude PSCs with others for the same 
route(s) to ensure appropriate service levels are in place for the carriage of traffic to, 
from or between islands. This is possible provided:  
 
- a real public service need can be demonstrated; and  
- the application of the two methods concurrently is not discriminatory and is 
justified in relation to the public interest objective being pursued. 
 
The ‘Cabotage Regulation’ requires that, for both imposing PSOs and concluding 
PSCs, the Member State shall do so on a non-discriminatory basis in respect of all 
community ship owners. Any subsidy for ferry services must be available to all 
community ship owners. All community ship owners are entitled to apply for 
compensation in exchange for accepting PSOs and (given that subsidies are paid via a 
PSC) all community ship owners should be entitled to tender for the provision of 
services for which subsidies will be paid.  
 
2.5. State Aid 
 
Where any support granted falls within the following conditions, it is deemed to 
constitute state aid and will need to be assessed to establish whether it is compatible 
with EU rules (European Commission, 2004): 
 
- the measure is granted by the state or through state resources;  
- the measure confers an advantage to an “undertaking” – “undertaking” covers any 
entity engaged in economic activity, and the legal status of the undertaking is not 
important;  
- the measure is liable to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings – the 
competitive position of the undertaking being selectively targeted is improved by 
the giving of the aid in relation to other competitors; and 
- the measure must have the potential for affecting trade between Member States. 
 
Where a member state intends to give lawful state aid, it should notify the 
Commission and seek authorisation for the aid. Otherwise, it may be treated as unlawful 
unless it is deemed to be de minimis or otherwise exempt. De minimis relates to the 
assessment of state aid and not the ‘Cabotage Regulation’s. Issues raised by each of the 
‘Cabotage Regulations’ procurement regulations and state aid rules need to be 
considered. 
The “Altmark” decision confirmed that a State measure will not be treated as state aid 
where it compensates an undertaking for discharging PSOs in a way that the 
undertaking does not enjoy a real financial advantage in exchange for discharging PSOs 
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(European Court, 2003). To fall outwith the definition of state aid, the following four 
conditions must be satisfied: 
 
- the receiving undertaking must actually have PSOs to discharge and these must be 
clearly defined; 
- the basis of compensation must be calculated in an objective and transparent 
manner; 
- compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the costs in discharging 
the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit; 
- if the undertaking concerned is not chosen under a public procurement procedure, 
then the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an 
analysis of costs which an efficient undertaking would have incurred. 
 
If a subsidy does not comply with one or more of the four Altmark criteria it must be 
regarded as state aid. In such cases, the measure will have to be notified to and approved 
by the Commission before it can be implemented. In any case involving public service 
compensation where the measure is within Article 87(1) of the Treaty, it may 
nevertheless be exempt under Article 86(2) of the Treaty where the conditions of that 
exemption are satisfied.  
 
 
3. Public tendering of ferry services  
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
This section of the paper investigates, based on a case study approach, the practical 
functioning and evolution of tender procedures in four European countries - Denmark, 
Greece, Sweden and Norway. For each country a brief introduction to the respective 
ferry sector and the delivery of PSO/PSC ferry services is given. This is followed by 
discussion and analysis of the procurement procedures, the methods/types of support 
given to ferry services, the public agencies involved, and the outcomes of tendering 
experiences as appropriate.  
Much of the information presented has been gained through direct contact with the 
tendering authorities and ferry operators in each of the respective countries. This has 
been supplemented by publicly available information. The four countries were selected 
because they each have recent experience of ferry service tendering and procurement in 
compliance with the above regulations. 
The aim is to identify the main strengths and weaknesses of each procurement 
approach, and to review the outcomes, in an effort to facilitate development of our 
conceptualisation of what could comprise an ‘optimal’ approach to 
tendering/procurement of subsidised ferry services within the context of EU regulations. 
 
3.2. Tendering of ferry services in Denmark 
 
Denmark has more than 400 islands, some of which are connected to the mainland or 
other islands by bridges while others are connected by ferries. There are a total of 65 
domestic ferry routes in Denmark (and approximately 20 international routes). 
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The Public Transport Authority (Trafikstyrelsen), an agency within the Danish 
Ministry of Transport, is engaged in national as well as international commitments. Its 
remit includes the administration of public procurement of railway and ferry transport 
services through organising tenders for operating contracts in accordance with 
Government decisions and to monitor the contractors' performance (Trafikstyrelsen 
2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Danish Ferry network. 
Source: http://www.trafikstyrelsen.dk. 
 
Until 2005, many ferries in Denmark were operated by the Danish state. In 2005, 
limited liability companies were created. The delivery of services today is summarised 
in Table 1, also giving an overview on the type of contract in place on different routes. 
Previously, most of the routes were both owned and run by local authorities. 
Consequently, many of the ferry companies have now been split into two entities: one 
company (often owned by the ‘state’, mostly at municipal level) which owns the ferry 
(or ferries) and berth facilities and another “operating” company which runs the service. 
However, on certain routes the operator also owns the ferries. 
Subsidies paid by the Danish State in accordance with PSCs are based on “net cost 
contracts”, where the shipping company receives the income from tickets. The tendering 
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authority in Denmark regulates the maximum and average ticket price for all tickets per 
ticket group. The level of operating subsidies for three PSCs in 2009 was as follows: 
 
- Rønne-Køge, Rønne–Ystad (ferry services Bornholm) – about €18.4 million p/a. 
- Samsø–Kalundborg - About €1.2 million p/a. 
- Bøjden-Fynshav - About €1 million p/a. 
Table 1: Ferry service delivery in Denmark. 
Route/area PSO/PSC Duration Comments 
    
2 routes 
(Rønne-Ystad and 
Rønne-Køge) 
PSO/PSC 5 years PSC operated by Bornholmstrafikken A/S 
    
18 routes  PSC/PSO On average 5 
years 
PSC not exclusive, with the exception of 
route Spodsbjerg-Tårs. 
    
16 routes PSC - Operated by local authorities; 16 tender 
procedures cancelled due to lack of 
interest from operators. 
    
11 routes PSC - Operated by local authorities; never 
submitted to tender procedures. 
Source: Derived from Trafikstyrelsen. 
 
Table 2 illustrates route characteristics for the Bornholm ferry services, including key 
service requirements, capacity and other relevant information. 
Subsidies in Denmark come out of the state budget and are split in terms of running 
costs and investment grants (for investments in port facilities, new ferries etc.). In the 
case of local government’s investments in ships and port facilities, the state, the regional 
government and the local government each contribute 1/3rd of the annual repayments. 
There is no protection for the PSO operator as such, but the local authorities can 
reduce fares on, for example, cross-fjord ferry lines, in order to attract more passengers 
and to change transport patterns. Any operator is free to establish a ferry line on a 
commercial basis as long as it is not in a ‘monopolised area’. Monopolised areas are 
concession areas where operators have the exclusive rights to operate. A few ferry lines 
(e.g. public service lines to the islands Ærø and Anholt) and the line Sælvig (on the 
island Samsø)-Hou (in Jutland) are monopolised. Tendering is based on small bundles 
of routes (as in Bornholm’s two routes tendered together) or for single route operations. 
The first round of Danish tenders run according to EU regulations was realised in 
1997. Tendering in the Danish context aims at benefitting users and communities and at 
decreasing subsidy levels. Public tendering is used as the means to ensure cost efficient 
transport services for citizens in all sectors of public transport in Denmark where today 
buses, trains, planes and ferries are all tendered. By 2009 the 3rd round of tenders was 
under way with the 4th round being prepared for. Specific tender contract requirements 
are shown in Figure 2. 
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Table 2: Route & service characteristics for Bornholm ferry services. 
 Ronne Koge Ronne -Ystad 
Distance 91.6 nm 38.8 nm 
Type of traffic Primarily freight + passenger Mainly passengers with cars + freight 
Time Night sailing (1130 – 0600) in both 
directions 
1 weekly trip for dangerous cargo 
High speed traffic, 2-5 sailings a day all 
year round 
Additional round trip with Ro-Pax per 
week in low season 
Extra sailings on key holidays with 
conventional car ferry 
Passenger Max. ca. 200, rarely > 100 in low 
season, rarely > 50 with berths  
Up to 7000 per day and direction  
Minimum ca. 3-400 per day in winter 
Freight Up to 75 trailers/night in each direction Up to 20 lorries a day/each direction 
Effects  Introduction of high speed craft has 
almost doubled passenger numbers in 
summer 
Source: Trafikstyrelsen. 
 
Service requirements differ by contract/route and an evolution of criteria can be 
observed when comparing the 2nd and 3rd round of tenders. The set requirements refer to 
the specific characteristics of each service. One change from the 2nd to the 3rd round is 
the contract length from 5 years (2003/2004) to 5 years plus a one year extension 
option. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Tender contract requirements in Denmark. 
Source: Authors. 
 
The selection criteria have evolved from “lowest price” to a selection of the 
“economically most advantageous application” in the 3rd round. The criteria as used in 
the latter are:  
 
- price, quality (70%), 
- flexible frequency and security of supply (20%) and  
- ferry quality (10%). 
 
Additionally, the technical and financial conditions of the bidding company are taken 
into account. This includes turnover in the shipping business for the last 3 years and a 
reference list regarding the most important shipping business service contracts for the 
last 3 years as well as a declaration regarding debt. 
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Operators are required to ‘bring their own ships’ and, in the case of the new Bornholm 
contract a new catamaran currently under construction in Australia is entirely funded by 
the company, financed by Nordea Bank. Bornholmstrafikken is however 50% owned by 
the state and 50% by the private sector, so at least some of the commercial risk still rests 
with the state. 
Procurement procedures differ by route, depending on the political focus and if the 
tender asks for deployment of new ferries. The current set up requires other bidders to 
bid against a government controlled operator (Bornholmstraffiken) that is also backed in 
the Nordic Ferry Services (NFS) joint venture by the 2nd largest Danish shipping 
company (Clipper A/S). 
Table 3: Bornholm ferry tender process, service requirements and selection criteria. 
 Tender process 
 Current contract Upcoming contract 
Contract signed 06/04 02/09 
Traffic start 05/05 09/11 
4 qualified operators: 
Scandlines Sydfynske A/S, Bornholmstrafikken/Nordic Ferry Services A/S, Mols-Linien A/S, 
Rederi Gotland AB 
1 application – Bornholmstrafikken (annual turnover ca. 70.6 mill €) 
Contract price/year: ca. 17.9 mill. €, 2004 prices ca. 27.0 mill. €, 2009 prices 
 Service requirements 
 Current contract Upcoming contract 
Ronne – Ystad route   
Capacity (max) 32 d/a with full capacity – 8 275 pax/d 
and 1 575 cars/d in each direction 
At least 32-38 d/a with min. 
10 000 pax/d and 2 200 cars/d in 
each direction 
Ship requirements 84 days with 1 high speed and 1 
conventional car ferry 
84 days with two high speed 
ferries 
Frequency and crossing 
time 
Min. 3 trips/d – 2 @ 75 min. and 1 @ 
150 min. 
Min. 3 trips/d @ 80 min. 
Ronne – Koge route 
 
Capacity (max) Min. 1235 lm, 400 pax/d per direction Min 1500 lm, 400 pax/d per 
direction 
 Selection criteria 
Criteria Lowest price Economically most 
advantageous application 
Negotiation No negotiation Negotiation 
Capacity Number of trips/ship, ship capacity, 
crossing times etc. 
Capacity/day and crossing 
time 
Risk Operator takes all economical risks, 
including consequences of rising oil prices 
Possibility of adding fuel-
surcharges as a consequence 
of rising oil prices 
Duration 5 years 5 years with option for 1 year 
Source: Trafikstyrelsen. 
 
The specific service requirements for the 2nd and 3rd tender round of the Bornholm 
service are shown in Table 3. Besides minimum daily capacity, seasonal adjustment of 
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crossing time, frequency and freight capacity, the requirement for an increase in 
capacity for the upcoming contract are included. 
Figure 3 provides an example of the timescale involved in the procurement procedure 
for the major ferry services to the island of Bornholm. The whole process took about 1.5 
years from time of publication of contract notices to contract signing. In the case of 
Bornholm the contract was signed in 2009, an order for an additional vessel was signed 
by the operator also in 2009, and this ship was due for delivery in 2011 in time for the 
new contracted service to commence. 
It is important to reflect that there was then an additional 2.5 years until the contract 
started – so a total of 4 years lead in time. This effectively means that 1 year into a 5 
year contract the tendering authority would be starting the tendering of the next 
contract, and that 2.5 years into a 5 year contract the existing operator might find he will 
no longer be the ferry operator. This creates a certain planning security for the winning 
operator and also provides time to effectively source tonnage for the service, if required. 
If the incumbent operator loses his contract to a competitor he then also has the 
possibility to prepare for a smooth exit and to look for alternative business. 
In the latest tender round, shipping companies are to a certain extent protected against 
the increasing price of oil as the operator is allowed to partly raise the price of the 
tickets in accordance with rising costs of oil. That is, the service users pay any oil 
surcharge, not the state. 
 
 
Figure 3: Procurement procedure/timescale for Bornholm ferry services. 
Source: Authors. 
 
3.3. Tendering of ferry services in Greece 
 
Domestic ferries link the economies of 114 inhabited islands in Greece to the 
mainland. There are approximately 150 ports at which a total of about a thousand ferry 
connections are made each day. The Greek ferry market is composed of 7 regions and 
58 ferry operators operating 365 itineraries. These can be split into:  
 
- 84 routes subsidised by the Greek State; 
- 30 short haul routes covering distances of up to 15 nautical miles; and  
- 242 free itineraries where competitive conditions prevail (i.e. no subsidy is 
provided). 
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About 70% of the coastal passenger ships operating in Greece are deployed in the 
Aegean Sea area. The Aegean network has a mono-hub structure based upon the Port of 
Piraeus. Additionally, 70% of the national passenger transport demand is served through 
the Aegean network. 
One of the main developments in the Greek ferry sector over the past 10 years has 
been the restructuring and modernisation of the fleet. Relatively new ships account for 
about half the fleet. On several high-volume routes fast ferries (i.e. ships with service 
speed > 24 knots) are now operating. Examples of ferry renewal include:  
 
- in mid-1999 Strintzis (now Blue Star Ferries) introduced two domestic routes in 
the Cyclades and Northern Aegean served by new high-speed ships; 
- Minoan introduced new fast ships on the Piraeus-Crete route in 2000; 
- new high-speed ships began to operate for Hellenic in the Aegean from 2000; 
and, 
- NEL introduced the first of three fast ships in 2000. 
 
Ionian Sea
N. Aegean
Crete
Sporades
Cyclades
Dodecanese
 
Figure 4: Greek ferry system. 
Source: XTRC 2008. 
 
Investment in new ships has also been closely linked with the development of the 
Athens Stock Exchange as a source of capital. The financing of Greek ferry companies 
has been made mainly via syndication loans (Lekakou & Vitsounis, 2008). All non-
listed companies have preferred bilateral loans. The new, faster vessels have in many 
cases greatly reduced travel time, e.g.: 
 
- between Piraeus to Rhodes via Kos, down to 10 hours from 18 hours; 
- Piraeus to Chania, down to 5¼ hours from 10 hours. 
 
Corresponding with a move towards faster and larger capacity ships, the number of 
ships employed has significantly decreased over time. However, fleet renewal has 
slowed over the past several years. The average age of the fleet in 2008 was 16.8 years. 
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In the Greek market all ferry operators are privately owned. The state does not operate 
any ferry services in Greece, and does not own ferries. However ports are in public 
ownership. Ferry companies specialise in particular routes and sea areas, often 
reflecting their historical roots on particular islands. For example, Minoan (now 
majority owned by Grimaldi, Naples) and ANEK, both based in Crete, historically held 
all the licenses for routes to Crete from the mainland (OECD, 2000). But the situation 
has since changed with new entrants such as Blue Star permitted to come into the 
market. This results in a challenge for authorities when deciding to what extent entry 
barriers should be lowered, thereby allowing for greater competition on particular 
routes. 
Domestic routes in Greece can be categorised as follows (Lekakou & Vitsounis, 
2008): 
 
- local, profitable and competitive routes 
- local, remote and with limited traffic routes 
- local, of average profitability routes 
 
Profitable and competitive routes carry significant tourist and local traffic, as well as 
commercial traffic. Examples include the East Cyclades complex of islands (e.g. Siros, 
Tinos, Mykonos). Expensive, modern, fast, high quality vessels are deployed on these 
routes. Access for new entrants is restricted to the minimum and competition and 
innovation effectively “drives” non-performing operators out of the market (Lekakou & 
Vitsounis, 2008). 
Vessels operating in the Aegean are mainly Ro–Pax type. The market has seen a 
strong concentration of operators over the last several years (Lekakou & Vitsounis, 
2008), albeit a fringe of smaller companies remains. Figure 5 indicates the percentage 
share split for passenger volumes carried by the top 5 operators; the sum of small 
operators is considered to account for less than 10% of the overall market. 
Demand for ferry services is highly seasonal and demand among the routes is highly 
skewed. August accounts for some 23% of total annual passengers carried, February for 
only 2%. This disparity is caused not only because of differences in tourism at the island 
destinations but also by differences in permanent population on the islands. 
The routes with low, highly seasonal traffic volumes and limited commercial viability 
are subsidised by the state, e.g. North East Aegean routes. Operators selected from the 
bidding process provide services based on a fixed income for a certain period, with set 
itineraries and destinations. A tendency of “lower” quality vessels on subsidised routes 
can be observed. 
Domestic ferry services are the responsibility of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine 
(MMM) and the Ministry of Aegean and Island Policy (MAIP), which were merged in 
2007. They are responsible for regulating and overseeing the sector, including: market 
entry, licensing, pricing, route scheduling, manning (hotel as well as engineering), 
imposition of PSOs, determination of and tendering for unprofitable routes, enforcement 
of licence terms, certification, control, vetting and inspection of ferries for navigational 
and environmental safety. The Minister issues inter alia licenses and decrees controlling 
prices, albeit only after a tender on a specific route that has been identified as being 
one that requires subsidy. 
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Figure 5: Market share of passengers, by ferry operator, Greece, 2005. 
Source: Lekakou & Vitsounis, 2008. 
 
Figure 6 indicates the estimated development of total aid for non-commercially viable 
ferry services in Greece. While the aid appears to be increasing continuously, not all this 
aid is paid by the State. Each ferry ticket sold in the major competitive/profitable ferry 
sector includes a 3% passenger surcharge which is then used (i.e. hypothecated) to help 
subsidise ferry services that cannot be operated in an economically viable way. This 
effectively means that economically viable and profitable routes help to subsidise the 
least profitable routes. Lines that are not subsidised understandably have a tendency to 
resent this ‘tax’. 
The overall subsidy level recorded an average annual increase of 8% between 2005-
2008. The amount of public funds reached a level of over €35 million for the coverage 
of 84 service itineraries in 2008 (subsidised services being termed ‘thin lines’). As the 
total aid amounted to €70 million, this means that about €35 million of aid (i.e. 50%) 
was raised from the competitive, profitable operators/routes. Of the 84 routes, 31 were 
subsidised by MMM and 53 by MAIP. These routes were served by 40 ferry operators. 
In comparison with other states the level of subsidy paid per service in Greece appears 
very low. This in part helps to explain the relatively poor quality of service provided on 
subsidised routes. Moreover, it is evident that the vast majority of ferry services in 
Greece are not subsidised at all. Figure 7 outlines the development of subsidised routes 
since 2002.  
The Greek State Law 2932/2001 anticipated the protection of public services in order 
to encourage the principle of competition. It was a first attempt to harmonize the 
political and state framework. However, the Greek ferry industry has not yet completely 
conformed to EU regulation 3577/1992 (Chlomoudis et al., 2007). 
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Figure 6: Greek Ferry Subsidies by number of routes (2005–2008), € Million. 
Source: Annual Greek budget reports. 
 
 
Figure 7: Aid for subsidised ferry services in Greece (2002-2008), € Million. 
Source: MMM. 
 
Procurement of services starts with analysis of whether a route requires subsidy. This 
is identified if no operator asks for operating permission on a specific route. If no 
operator can operate that route profitably, competitive tenders are run that identify the 
bidder requesting the minimum subsidy. Government sets the maximum subsidy level 
for that specific route and the minimum requirements for “essential services” (i.e. 
effectively the PSO) which are shown in Figure 8. 
Lekakou (2007) concluded that oligopolistic market features and ineffective state 
policies have resulted in an unstable coastal market in Greece and this has undermined 
the quality of the supplied shipping services. She stresses the essential characteristics 
that a passenger transportation network with a strong public interest has to fulfil (i.e. 
system accessibility, affordability, safety/security, quality requirements, etc.) and 
highlights the limited extent to which these criteria have been applied as pre-conditions 
for developing modern and efficient Greek coastal shipping. Fulfilling these criteria 
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would nevertheless seem to imply the need for a significant increase in public subsidies 
which, especially considering the current economic crisis, seems unlikely. 
 
 
Figure 8: Minimum requirements for essential ferry services in Greece. 
Source: Authors. 
 
3.4. Tendering of ferry services in Sweden 
 
The major subsidised ferry service connecting an island with the mainland in Sweden 
relates to the island of Gotland. Ferry services to the island of Gotland are tendered by 
Swedish National Public Transport Agency Rikstrafiken. Gotland is situated in the 
Baltic Sea, about 100 km from the Swedish mainland. The island has over 57,000 
inhabitants, or 0.7% of the population of Sweden (Commission des Isles, 2003). 
Gotland has regular ferry services on two routes guaranteed via a PSC (Figure 9): 
Visby–Nynäshamn and Visby–Oskarshamn, plus summer traffic to Öland, all operated 
by the same ferry company – Destination Gotland. 
Since 1998, the private operator-owned and financed fleet serving Gotland has been 
completely renewed (ShipPax, 2009). Destination Gotland carried 1.5m passengers, 
450,000 cars, and 700,000 lane meters of Ro-Ro cargo (i.e. over 50,000 trailers) in 
2008. 
In June 1998 the Swedish Parliament decided on a new transport policy, resulting in a 
new agency – the National Public Transport Agency, or Rikstrafiken – being 
established. Rikstrafiken’s transport policy objective is to achieve a socio-economically 
efficient and long-term transport supply for the entire country (Rikstrafiken, 2009). 
Working together with the rail, road, sea and aviation administrations and authorities, 
Rikstrafiken has two main tasks: 
 
- to procure public transport services (air, rail, sea, bus); and 
- to develop and coordinate public transport throughout the country 
 
PSCs for ferry services to and from Gotland initially came into force towards the end 
of the 1980s, when services were first subjected to competitive procurement procedures. 
The current legislation (SFS 1996:19) on limiting the right to operate ferry services to 
Gotland dates from 1996 and the government’s decree (1997:748) that specifies the 
regulation came out the following year. 
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Figure 9: Ferry routes to Gotland. 
Source: Destination Gotland. 
 
Anyone who carries out regular sea transport between Gotland and the Swedish 
mainland must make a call at a mainland port at least five times a week year-round; this 
is a requirement of the route PSO. The purpose behind these provisions is to hinder 
anyone from carrying traffic only during periods when there is a great demand (i.e. 
summer tourists), to the detriment of the contracted services, or in other words ‘cherry 
picking’. Requirements in the regulation of year-round traffic means that the procured 
ferry services are, in practice, carried out without competition from other ferry traffic 
(i.e. they enjoy exclusivity). 
The Swedish Government has developed specific support measures for the island with 
the objective of ensuring an affordable price for all types of transport. In Sweden, gross 
contracts are the dominant contract form. This means the operator provides an agreed 
amount of transport services, with compensation then paid to the operator while ticket 
income goes to the Public transport authority. 
The tendering process that preceded the current contract for the Gotland traffic was a 
disappointment for Rikstrafiken. In the first round, no bids were received. In the second 
round, which took place in early 2006, Destination Gotland, the incumbent operator, 
placed the only bid that was received. 
Rikstrafiken has since stated its intention to alter the next bidding process. Under the 
new regime, there may be two separate tenders for the Gotland service – one will 
concern the supply of the vessels and the other will concern the operation of the ships 
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on the route (ShipPax, 2010). Rikstrafiken also proposes shorter routes and new vessels 
with lower speeds and emissions. 
Stakeholders (i.e. groups mainly representing islanders and island businesses) have 
pointed out that there are several aspects of the proposed changes that would result in 
deteriorations viewed from the Gotland standpoint. Some basic elements include: 
 
- if slower crossings are introduced this may put at risk development of tourism and 
the travelling possibilities for firms and Gotlanders, therefore swift crossings must 
be considered of high value in the bidding process; 
- present capacity is believed to be inadequate for freight, for the peak travelling 
season and to take into account any increase of cargo, cars and passengers – this is 
crucial for development of the Gotland economy and community; and, 
- already ferry charges are considered to be too high. 
 
State subsidies for Gotland passenger traffic have grown substantially from about €3.1 
million/year in the mid-1980s to the 2009 level of approximately €46.4 million/year. 
Rikstrafiken’s compensation for the total term of the current contract (2009-2015) is 
€290 million for Gotland’s two routes. The proceeds from ferry services in 2005 was 
approximately €79.8 million, divided 53% for passenger ticket proceeds, 9% for freight 
traffic proceeds and 38% for Rikstrafiken’s compensation.  
Subsidies paid to support Gotland’s two routes therefore amount to more than half the 
total subsidy allocated in Greece, the latter supporting some 84 routes involving a 
subsidy of €70 million. 
 
3.5. Tendering of ferry services in Norway 
 
Whilst Norway is not a member of the EU the country tends to adopt a similar 
approach to procurement of public services as countries within the EU.  
There are estimated to be some 300 ferries operating in Norway today. Most of the 
ferries are owned and operated by private firms. But, like almost all other forms of 
public transport, many services operate at a loss and therefore require subsidy. The total 
annual subsidy for ferries in Norway is above €73.8 million (Minken & Killi, 2000). 
Ferry links are considered to be a part of the Norwegian trunk road system. The 
National Public Roads Administration is responsible for supplying vehicle ferry services 
connecting trunk roads, and for regulating both prices and service parameters (e.g. 
operating hours, frequencies etc.). The Norwegian Public Roads Administration is 
divided into five departments each based in different parts of the country (North, South, 
East, West and Mid). In addition, tendering responsibilities have also been devolved to 
road agencies for local ferry services (mostly passenger ferries) operating in their areas 
(since 1994). 
The traditional subsidy scheme has provided for improvements in services (e.g. 
frequencies, operating hours etc.), albeit at an increasing cost. Since the subsidy system 
was not considered sufficient in providing incentives to achieve cost efficiency, tender 
competitions have been introduced (Odeck & Bråthen, 2009). 
It is argued that tendering has delivered substantial cost savings to the public sector in 
Norway (Bråthen et al., 2004). It is further suggested that where operating costs are 
perceived to be particularly high, or where there is a need for new vessels, tendering can 
prove successful as a correcting mechanism. 
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Ferry services are maintained by private ferry companies, each operating a monopoly 
franchise on a single route or across a relatively small bundle of ferry routes within a 
single region/area. Bundles/routes are therefore decided on a geographic area basis. A 
key distinction is that major trunk road ferry connections are tendered from the national 
level, whereas local/regional ferry services typically connecting outlying areas with the 
main regional towns in that area are tendered by local authorities (LAs) and/or local 
transport agencies. 
While some single routes have been tendered (e.g. out of Tromso), several tenders 
have involved small bundles involving between 2-5 routes linking outlying areas and 
islands to the same major regional town/city at which essential services for health, 
recreation, education, business, and government are accessed. 
Until 1990 subsidies were paid ex post on a cost-plus basis, but this was considered a 
weak incentive in cost efficiency terms. Since 1990, subsidies have been paid ex ante to 
encourage cost efficiency (Bråthen et al., 2004).  
Tender documents are designed within the local area transportation departments as 
sufficient expertise exists from tenders which these same departments run in other areas 
(e.g. for buses and airlines). Evaluation is undertaken by a group from the transport 
department and lawyers using a pre-specified template. The administrative management 
of the transport department makes the final choice of operator.  
In the calls for tender (first six tenders after 1994), six to nine bids were received for 
each route. Significant differences in the required subsidy levels were found in the 
tenders for each route. In five of six cases, the incumbent operators won the tender. 
All tenders were evaluated on the basis of multi criteria, with cost being only one of 
the criteria. Non-monetary criteria included: environmental impacts, safety, 
quality/functionality, capacity, ferry, and option of services (Table 4). Experience in 
Norway indicates that costs should be valued at no more than 40% overall. 
Table 4: Møre - Romsdal tender evaluation criteria. 
Criterion Weight (%) Basis 
Price 35 Annual compensation and compensation by modified route 
production and consideration of changed hours 
Age of vessels built 35 Age of reserve vessel also attributed 
Delivery-quality 30 Emergency procedures for the reserve of supply vessels 
(cleaning programme, maintenance of passenger amenities) 
Source: Sunde et al. 2008. 
 
In recent years, trunk route ferry tenders have resulted in investment by private 
operators in more than 8 new large ferries (covering 6 routes) with an estimated capex 
of €91 million, as well as additional quality improvements (improved frequency etc.). 
And on local/regional routes several operators have introduced new vessels after 
winning tenders (e.g. Veolia, Tide).  
The duration of tendered contracts varies between 5-8 years, depending on the need 
for asset-specific investments. The contract duration is not seen as a huge matter for the 
operator: if a private company invests in a vessel with a lifetime of 20-30 years it is 
expected to be able to use its ferry for more than one contract period, the lower 
depreciation cost affording some advantage in subsequent bidding rounds. Decisions on 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 49 (2011): 90-111 
 
 
108
specific ferry sizes/capacity and ferry acquisitions are left to the operating companies 
themselves.  
Service timetabling is perceived as crucial in the tender processes, especially by ferry 
companies. The Norwegian Government sets quality standards. This includes retaining 
control of maximum prices and subsidies. A frequency premium is seen as a good 
incentive to overcome varying conditions (e.g. varying unit costs). Operators able to 
offer higher frequency are rewarded accordingly in the evaluation. Selection is based on 
the economically most advantageous offer, pursuant to Regulations Section Bidding. All 
criteria are assessed on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 is the best score. Bidding criteria are 
almost evenly split between three aspects – price, vessel and quality.  
Price is undoubtedly a legitimate award criterion. The vessels’ age is basically a legal 
award criterion. It is questionable whether it is expedient to use age as the only award 
criterion linked to the vessels as it does not necessarily refer to a vessel's quality and 
suitability.  
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our analysis of experiences in contracting ferry services indicates that ferry service 
procurement involves a continuous evolutionary process of specifying, offering, 
selecting, monitoring and reviewing services supplied. A number of common patterns 
are repeated across the range of countries under study.  
Reflecting this commonality, the authors have developed on the basis of the research a 
‘ferry tendering route map’ (Figure 10). The route map sets out what we consider to be 
the fundamentals of the ferry tendering process. In line with the aims of the paper, the 
case studies have helped facilitate development of our conceptualisation of what we 
consider should comprise an ‘optimal’ approach by transport authorities to 
tendering/procurement of subsidised ferry services taking into account EU regulations 
The case studies suggest that Sweden, Norway and Denmark are continuously 
revising their procurement strategies. EU regulation is in general not seen as a barrier 
for development, but rather one more argument that supports the idea to secure efficient 
ferry services via tendering. 
The procurement of ferry services is based on the same principles as procurement of 
transport services across other modes. Transport authorities at local, regional and 
national levels are managing ferry tenders, as well as managing tenders for local bus 
services, air services, and at the national level rail services.  
In Denmark, the public procurement strategy has been successful on a number of 
routes, albeit less successful on some small-scale routes. The tender exercise from a 
public sector perspective is seen as a tool to drive operations to higher efficiency levels. 
However, out of 27 ferry route tender exercises undertaken in Denmark, only 2 routes 
actually changed operator. Nevertheless, the number of bidders – when comparing the 
2nd and 3rd round – has increased, and foreign bidders are now appearing in the process. 
A move towards multi-criteria evaluation in order to identify the economically most 
advantageous bid reflects the need to consider service quality as well as cost. A high 
weighting given to cost may reduce the impact of quality in the selection process. 
Evidence suggests that the duration of the contract (5 to 6 years) is not a barrier to the 
deployment of new vessels, notwithstanding the fact that tendering authorities do not 
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necessarily require brand new tonnage at every round (e.g. used vessels may be 
acceptable). 
The Greek approach provides for a number of interesting observations. The Greek 
ferry industry was able to significantly improve fleet structure, especially driven by the 
threat of external entrants and helped by sophisticated private finance strategies. While 
these improvements primarily reflect experience on higher volume profitable routes, 
they do not seem to have reached the more peripheral and less densely populated 
islands. For the latter, incentives given through the procurement process do not seem to 
be sufficient enough to stimulate service improvements (Lekakou & Vitsounis, 2008). 
Moreover, the one year duration of contracts is clearly insufficient to allow operators to 
make necessary investments in new or replacement vessels; this should be changed to 
longer periods of at least 5-6 years, as is now common practice in other states. 
 
 
Figure 10: Ferry tendering route map. 
Source: Authors. 
 
The level of customer satisfaction in respect of subsidised routes/services in Greece is 
rather low, with complaints about the limited frequency of service, the poor quality of 
vessels and slow speed (Chlomoudis et al., 2007). The evidence further suggests that 
overall subsidy levels in Greece may be inadequate in terms of improving service 
quality. Moreover, the strategy of forcing profitable ferry operators (and their 
customers) to help subsidise unrelated non-profitable services also seems questionable, 
primarily as this effectively penalizes/taxes successful non-subsidised services. 
In Sweden, the case of Gotland demonstrates that the contracted operator has 
delivered improvements to the service in terms of modern ships and service quality, and 
achieved growing passenger numbers, albeit at rather high ongoing cost to the public 
sector  On the other hand the responsible agency, Rikstrafiken, is continuously pushing 
for more competition in the market, albeit the latest move to open up the market seems 
somewhat confused (i.e. the proposal to have separate tenders for ships and operations). 
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The lack of interest from other bidders (aside from the incumbent operator) suggests the 
possibility of barriers to entry (e.g. access to vessels). 
The Norwegian experience in procurement of ferry services illustrates that: 
competitive tendering of individual routes has been perceived as a means to improve 
cost efficiency; it is a challenge to design the right measures that enhance allocative 
efficiency (allocative efficiency occurs when there is an optimal distribution of goods 
and services, taking into account consumer preferences), and; tender specification and 
procurement expertise needs to evolve over time and requires constant adjustment based 
on market development and experience. The Norwegian case gives clear evidence of 
improvements achieved in terms of service quality through tendering, including private 
investment in new ships. It also defies the myth that subsidies necessarily increase after 
deploying tendering procedures. We consider the Norwegian experience to represent 
probably the most successful and best developed approach to procurement of ferry 
services in Europe. 
A tendency towards the further expansion of pan-European integrated transport 
providers into ferry markets via tenders can be observed. These entities are increasingly 
familiar with tender procedures, across different transport modes, throughout Europe. 
This is mainly because such firms are now frequently involved in tendering for public 
transport bus, rail, as well as ferry services, throughout Europe.  
Submitting an operator to a tender compels it to reassess the value for money it is 
providing, and the efficiency of its services, thus leading to better services; this is 
especially true when there is the “threat” of effective competition. Also noticeable is the 
increasing role of private operators, with private firms willing to invest in new vessels, 
in turn limiting the need for state managed/owned operations. 
Tendering is clearly a continuous process which is repeated over set periods. 
Arguments that the process is found to be too complex, long in duration and too 
expensive may be related to procurement in countries with a weak or discontinued 
procurement strategy. The timing of tendering procedures is decisive, since only strict 
timelines can provide the necessary framework for operators to prepare attractive bids. 
Finally, it should be remembered that public tendering of ferry services is only 
necessary when the market is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate service on a 
given route. There are many routes throughout Europe where the market does indeed 
provide an adequate service, without subsidy, and which therefore negates in these 
circumstances any need for tenders. 
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